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Abstract
This paper develops a view of how specific elements of the directors' human and social
capital can enhance a company's international performance. We have taken the view that
the board is an active participant in the firm’s management, and we have therefore set out
and tested a number of arguments related to the board’s role in the adoption of interna-
tional decisions. Specifically, our results point to the need to incorporate board members
with high levels of education and international background with ability to learn and
process information and to help international decision-making. As shown by our results,
a high level of external connectivity of directors could have negative repercussions for
internationalization since they limit the time spent on the board and therefore reduces the
cohesion and trust inside the board. The implications of this research, therefore, are
important for both executives and academics, as it helps to know what attributes con-
tribute to the board’s effectiveness in such a way as to positively affect the international-
ization of the firm.
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The literature on corporate governance highlights the importance of the board’s
effectiveness for achieving company success (Petrovic, 2008; Nicholson and Kiel,
2004). Boards of directors are a key element in the study of corporate governance,
not only because of their disciplinary or controlling roles, but also because of their
active participation in their company’s key decisions (Barroso, De la Concha, Veci-
no and Villegas, 2009). We believe that the board’s participation in a company’s
major international decisions is particularly important. Globalisation and the liber-
alisation of financial markets have dramatically changed the business environment,
making internationalisation strategies more important than ever before. Businesses
around the world are becoming increasingly globalised, which encourages firms to
develop an international presence. Under these conditions, firms need to have effec-
tive boards that can make appropriate decisions on internationalisation.
However, despite the importance of the board for the organisation’s results and
the high degree of internationalisation that many firms have experienced in recent
years, the majority of studies relating to these two concepts continue to rely on tra-
ditional variables as the explanatory elements for their models: the proportion of
external directors; board size; or duality of CEO / President of the Board of Direc-
tors (Ellstrand, Tihanyi and Johnson, 2002; Datta, Musteen and Herrmann, 2009;
Petrovic, Kakabadse, A. and Kakabadse, N.K., 2006; Kim, Prescott and Kim, 2005;
Rivas, 2012; Lien, Piesse, Strange and Filatotchev, 2005). In general, these variables
have been characterised by ambiguity, and investigators have been unable to reach a
consensus on the variables that define the boards that are more or less effective in
fulfilling their roles, and therefore, in affecting the firm’s international performance
(Kim, 2005; Kim and Cannella, 2008; Daily and Dalton, 1993; Dalton, Daily, John-
son and Ellstrand, 1999).
Furthermore, from our point of view, these works have proposed a set of unsuit-
able and incomplete models, in which boards of directors are treated as homogenous
groups, without taking account of their social and human dimensions (Tian, Hale-
blian and Rajagopalan, 2011; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). More in-depth studies
need to be carried out into how board composition, through its human and social
capital, affects the firm’s international performance. While human capital allows
directors to become familiar with and understand the logic and dynamics of exter-
nal markets and the global business environment, its social capital provides external
information that mitigates the risks associated with internationalisation strategies.
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) propose a theoretical model that examines how
board capital, consisting of human and social capital, affects the firm’s performance.
In the wake of this study, many researchers have carried out empirical analyses of
how certain elements of the board’s human and social capital can be used to improve
the firm’s principal organisational results (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi and Cannella,
2008; Stevenson and Radin, 2009; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Wincent,
Anokhin and Boter, 2009; Tian et al., 2011; Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Dalziel,
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Gentry and Bowerman, 2011). However, the joint effect of these two elements on the
firm’s international results has been overlooked. While there are a few prior studies
that analyse the effect of the human capital of the TMT on the firm’s principal inter-
national results, (Athanassiou and Nigh, 2002; Peyrefitte, Fadil and Thomas, 2002;
Reuber and Fischer, 1997; Sambharya, 1996), there are virtually no studies that
analyse the board’s human capital, and even fewer that also include external social
capital. Therefore, the principal objective of this study is to carry out an empirical
analysis of the importance of the board of directors on the principal international
results, including a study not only of the resources brought by the board through its
own human capital, but also through its access to new, external resources.
In this study we aim to highlight the importance for the firm of the board’s capac-
ity, through its knowledge and abilities, to tackle the complexity and the high
demand for information-processing associated with international diversification.
The knowledge that the firm’s board members contribute, through their experience,
could be used in international markets to overcome the risks associated with foreign
operations (Ellstrand et al., 2002). Similarly, although individual board members
possess unique resources, they also require access to complementary resources, such
as information, power and influence, so that they can be involved in the management
of international business. A diversity of external contacts gives board members
greater access to information on the markets, innovations, capital, investors and oth-
er key assets that are needed to launch a new business. These connections could also
benefit the company by serving as a communication channel between external organ-
isations and the firm, and would be a very important tool when particular informa-
tion is required to mitigate the risks associated with internationalisation.
This work is structured as follows: in the first section we set out the reasons for
choosing this topic, and explain our main objectives. In the following sections we
carry out a literature review, which will help us to formulate a set of hypotheses. In
the final section we present the empirical evidence and an analysis and interpretation
of the data obtained.
Literature review and working hypotheses
The human capital of the board
The human capital of the board can be defined as the capabilities and knowledge
that individual members bring to the board, stemming from their investment in edu-
cation and/or experience (Stevenson and Radin, 2009; Becker, Huselid and Ulrich,
2001; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Wincent, Anokhin and Örtqvist, 2010; Kor and
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Lester et al., 2008; Becker, Chambers and Wilks, 1988; Cole-
man, 1988). While knowledge acquired through experience (accumulated or not)
leads to the adoption of specific human capital, learning, through education, tends
to have a more general connotation, since it is assumed that the benefits of educa-
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tion encompass not only learned information, but also the abilities associated with
learning through a diversity of situations. Both elements are included in this study.
The structures for learning and knowledge gained from a higher level of formal
education will be of immense value for boards (Wincent et al., 2010; Reeb and Zhao,
2009; Kim and Lin, 2010). Board members with high levels of education bring a
greater ability for learning and more effective information-processing (Bantel and
Jackson, 1989; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Pennings, Lee and van Witteloostujin,
1998; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and they are therefore able to become involved
in the company’s strategies. Board members with high levels of education are more
likely to participate in the firm’s international strategies, since these require the direc-
tors to quickly assimilate large amounts of complex information and if the knowl-
edge structures are in place, they are more able to interpret and categorise the infor-
mation presented to them. There is evidence of a positive relationship between higher
levels of education among directors and their willingness to make use of external
information and external consultants or to monitor more extensively the firm’s
accounting systems (Crabtree and Gomolka, 1991).
More highly educated people are better able to find creative solutions to help the
firm they represent (Wincent et al., 2009). They are fundamental to the acquisition,
use and understanding of knowledge, and the development of abilities that support
effective decision-making in an international context. A higher level of education is
also associated with openness to innovation and a tolerance of ambiguity (Goll,
Johnson and Rasheed, 2007); two fundamentally important aspects when the board
is considering strategic change linked to the firm’s internationalisation.
We therefore propose the following working hypothesis:
H1. The board members’ level of education is positively related to the degree of the
firm’s international diversification.
In addition to examining the board’s level of education, the majority of studies
focus on a more specific human capital, derived from the directors’ experiences
(Stevenson and Radin; 2010; Tian et al., 2011; Kroll, Walters and Wright, 2008;
Haynes and Hillman 2010; Kor and Misangyi, 2008; Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt and
Webb, 2008). Experience (either personal or via feedback from an event) improves
future behaviours specifically because of the knowledge that has been acquired. Indi-
viduals who learn and accumulate knowledge through experience feel more enabled
and make a more active contribution to the firm’s competitive advantage (March,
1999). Directors with experience can participate more fully in their role because,
through their learning, they might be able to make a positive contribution to the
firm’s results. The possession of relevant knowledge and learning through experi-
ence, therefore, could be important for explaining board effectiveness (Kroll et al.,
2008).
Board members’ international experience brings a specific tacit knowledge, which
is one of the resources that is hardest to imitate (Barney, 1991). Firms can improve
their ability to face the challenges of the international environment by electing mem-
bers to the board that have the particular characteristics, abilities or experience
required for the internationalisation process. A director’s international experience
might be an attractive characteristic for other firms that are interested in acquiring
this tacit knowledge.
Many studies have researched the role of the top management team in the firm’s
international behaviour (Athanassiou and Nigh, 2002; Peyrefitte et al. 2002; Reuber
and Fischer, 1997; Sambharya, 1996), and have established links between the TMT’s
international experience and internationalisation, but few studies have examined the
effect of the board of director’s influence on the firm’s internationalisation. Board
members with experience of international markets possess the knowledge and abili-
ties to deal with the actual institutions, firms and networks in foreign markets. They
also help with the collection, analysis and interpretation of information on world-
wide opportunities. They can therefore play a fundamental supporting role in the
decision-making process with regard to international business (Zahra, Priem and
Rasheed, 2007).
Finally, it is important to point out that, beyond their general educational level,
board members with a foreign education will be more open-minded towards other
cultures. Board members who have studied abroad will be more aware of interna-
tional problems and will be more inclined to look for international opportunities. We
therefore believe that the international background of the board members, measured
by their international experience and/or education, is positively related to the level
of international development achieved by the firms that they govern.
Therefore:
H2. The board members’ international background is positively related to the degree
of the firm’s international diversification.
Social capital of the board
As we have suggested in the hypotheses above, the members of the board are
resources for the firm and will be evaluated according to their competences and
knowledge (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000).
Similarly, researchers consider that boards are useful for giving access to resources
via their social connections. The firm will try to develop strategies that make use of
the strengths of the resources that it possesses, but will also attempt to acquire new,
external resources. If we consider that the board brings exogenous resources and
capabilities to the firm, which enable continuous adaptation to the competitive envi-
ronment, and that social capital provides access to those exogenous resources, which
are mobilised through relationships, then this means that external social capital plays
a critical role in the survival and success of a firm at international level. Firms today
adopt strategies that are oriented to international business, and therefore members
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of the board of directors must be given privileged access to the network of external
actors so that they can help to establish these strategies (Yeung, 2002). In practice,
this means that the board can be used as a link to other firms and governing bodies,
to help it to establish operations and strategic alliances abroad (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978).
As with the general management team, board members who are directors on
other boards can convert their experience, through their interlocks, into an impor-
tant resource that allows them to further develop their roles, by applying their
external experiences to the firm. Some studies have examined the transmission of
ideas through the board’s social ties, establishing a positive relationship between
interlocks and the firm’s adoption of new strategies (Geletkanycz and Hambrick,
1997; Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal et al., 2001). Thus, while strategic decisions relat-
ing to investment in R&D, entry into new markets or setting up subsidiaries in
international markets bring significant benefits for the firm’s growth, they also
tend to be complex operations, given the high levels of uncertainty and risk of fail-
ure linked to them (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). In this context, interlocks are a
very important tool that gives board members the opportunity to access informa-
tion that mitigates risks and to seek information from other firms. This type of link
could benefit the firm by acting as a communication channel between external
organisations and the firm. Connelly et al. (2011) studied the effects of interlocks
on the probability of a firm adopting an international strategy and point out that
the interlocks of a firm that has successfully put into practice an international
strategy have a positive effect on the likelihood that other firms will adopt the
same strategy.
It is therefore necessary for a firm to have strong social networks, created by the
members of its board, in order to gain information and experience of foreign mar-
kets. Moreover, the information acquired is particularly influential, because it comes
from a trustworthy source (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997).
However, despite these benefits, there can be some costs. A director who belongs
to multiple boards has limited time and attention to dedicate to any particular
board (Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Conger, Lawler and Finegold, 2001). Holding a
directorship is seen as a prestigious post that brings very valuable learning oppor-
tunities, and therefore board members might be tempted to accept invitations to
serve on several boards at the same time (Useem, 1982). It is likely that these board
members would be unprepared for board meetings through lack of time, or might
be unable to attend meetings on a regular basis, in which case their contribution to
the board would be negatively affected (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Conger et
al., 2001; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). We should not forget that international-
isation is a complex and costly decision and requires the full participation, support
and collaboration of the entire board of directors, and therefore the reduced par-
ticipation or commitment of members who belong to multiple boards is very likely
to have a negative effect.
We therefore propose the following working hypothesis:
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H3: There is a curvilinear (inverted-U) relationship between the degree of the exter-
nal connections of directors who are members of multiple boards and the degree
of the firm’s international diversification.
Methodology
Sample and data collection
The sample of firms used in this study consists of the Spanish firms registered on
the Madrid Stock Exchange and which were quoted on the Continuous Market dur-
ing the period 2005-2010. These firms were chosen because of their requirement to
publish data pertaining to their corporate governance and international perform-
ance. We then eliminated those firms that are classed as financial service companies
(if they include estate agency services), because of the difficulty of interpreting all of
the data related to this sector; companies that were removed from the stock market
during the analysis period (we only included firms that were quoted on the stock
market from 2005-2010 inclusive); and firms whose annual reports we did not have
access to. This left a group of 84 firms, but from this total we had to remove firms
with no international activity in one or more years of the study period 2005-2010.
We understand no international activity to mean that the entirety of the firm’s sales
and assets are attributable to the domestic market; and we therefore included firms
in the sample with international assets but no sales, and vice versa.
After applying these restrictions, the sample comprised 78 firms and 468 obser-
vations for each of the variables used in our study.
Dependent variable
International diversification is a strategy a firm uses to sell its products or servic-
es in new geographical markets that extend beyond national and regional boundaries
(Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller and Connelly, 2006). Internationalisation has been measured
in different ways in the literature and continues to be the subject of debate (Elango
and Sethi, 2007; Reuber and Fischer, 1997). Sullivan (1994) argues that multi-item
measures should be used, rather than individual variables. This author was one of
the first to identify the term “degree of internationalisation of a firm”, defined by
three dimensions: the performance aspect (foreign sales); the structural aspect (for-
eign assets); and attitudinal aspects (the international experience of top manage-
ment). Ramaswamy, Kroeck and Renforth (1996) also recognise that multi-item
measures are more reliable than single-item measures, and identify various limita-
tions of using a single measure.
In this study, and in line with Sullivan (1994) and other studies (Daily, Certo,
and Dalton, 2000; Lee and Park, 2006; Rivas, Hamori and Mayo, 2009; Sanders
and Carpenter, 1998), we measure a firm’s internationalisation by more than a sin-
gle dimension; namely, through its performance and its structure. These dimensions
both represent the “depth” of the firm’s foreign participation (Thomas and Eden,
2004). Like Reuber and Fischer (1997), we have not used experience as a compo-
nent of internationalisation, as experience is already one of the concepts in our
hypotheses.
The performance dimension is usually calculated by using the ratio of sales in for-
eign subsidiaries to total sales (FSTS) (Geringer, Beamish and daCosta, 1989). This
captures the importance of international operations as part of the firm’s overall oper-
ations and therefore the degree of its dependence on foreign markets (Thomas and
Eden, 2004). The structural dimension is usually calculated as the percentage of for-
eign assets to total assets (FATA) (Daniels and Bracker, 1989). FATA reflects a firm’s
confidence regarding the number of foreign assets it owns. In the international busi-
ness literature, the dimensions of international sales and assets are related to the
firm’s dependence on foreign consumer markets and foreign resources (Sanders and
Carpenter, 1998). Likewise, and using the data collected from the database described
above, we calculated the total number of each firm’s assets in external regions or
markets and divided that figure by the total number of assets owned by the firm.
The theoretical range for each dimension is 0 to 1. The two variables (foreign
sales and foreign assets) will form our composite measure of the degree of interna-
tionalisation and therefore we will use a theoretical range from 0 to 2. To summarise,
we chose this composite measure because it is a better measurement of the firm’s
internationalisation than unidimensional variables (Lu and Beamish, 2004).
The information was extracted from the audited reports obtained from the
CNMV database. These consolidated reports (the majority issued by Pricewater-
houseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte) provide information relating to the dis-
tribution of sales and assets for each of the geographical sectors in which the firm
operates and owns its assets. From this data we can obtain information on the sales
and assets of the firm both in Spain and in other regions or markets.
Independent variables
On one hand we have the variables that define the board’s human capital, such
as educational level and international background, and on the other hand, we have
the variables that define social capital, such as the interlocks between boards.
In order to calculate the board members’ level of education, we have codified the
education variable as 1 if the board member holds a Masters Degree and 0 if they do
not (Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva, 2007; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Wiersema and
Bantel, 1992). Almost all of the board members included in our sample have a qual-
ification in higher education (in law, economics, engineering, etc.) and a high per-
centage of them have also attained a Masters Degree. In Spain, until the new regu-
lation regarding the European Credit Transfer System, having a degree was a
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prerequisite for taking a Masters. To measure board members’ international back-
ground (experience and/or training abroad), we used a dichotomous variable that
was codified as 1 if the board member occupies or has occupied a post abroad for
any time or, if they were working abroad, if they were placed in an international divi-
sion. Similarly, we also consider that they have an international background if they
have attained a higher education qualification abroad. We codified this variable as 0
if this had not occurred (Rindova, 1999). The board’s educational level and its inter-
national background were measured as the percentage of board members holding
these resources over the total number of board members (Wincent et al., 2009)
We define the board’s external social capital through its interlocks; the links
formed when one board member sits on the board of another firm. Measuring inter-
locks has been used previously in the literature on boards of directors (Kor and Sun-
daramurthy, 2009; Wincent et al., 2009; Haney and Hillman, 2010; Tian et al.,
2011; Filatotchev, 2006; Pombo and Gutiérrez, 2011; Ortiz, Aragón, Delgado and
Ferrón, 2012). To calculate the figure we added the total number of links from all
board members and divided it by board size –the total number of board members.
The resulting measure is the average number of interlocks per board.
To obtain the information on each member’s interlocks, we turned to Axesor, a
consultancy firm specialising in providing information on firms and their executives,
derived from official records. The information provided by Axesor is available from
the Boletín Oficial del Registro Mercantil (the Official Mercantile Registry Newslet-
ter) and includes a list of directorships that each board member holds on one or more
boards –both listed and unlisted on the stock exchange.
Control variables
In accordance with prior studies on corporate governance, we have included the
following control variables that might affect the proposed relationships: firm size;
business sector; firm age; board size; duality (of President and Chief Executive); and
the proportion of external board members.
Board size is commonly used as a control variable, given its relationship with the
firm’s results. Bigger firms are more actively involved in exporting and undertaking
international operations (Calof, 1993; Zahra et al., 2007), probably because they
have greater resources. Bigger firms also benefit from more specialised staff, who are
capable of exploring foreign markets and are better able to supervise international
expansion. Firm size has been measured, as in prior investigations, by the logarithm
of the number of employees in each firm during the period of our study.
The firms included in our sample cover a broad mix of sectors, since operating in
a particular sector might affect internationalisation (Rivas et al., 2009). We have
therefore included the sector as a control variable in our study. We have used the
information from the stock market sectoral classification database proposed by the
CNMV (National Share Market Commission), codified as follows: 1) petroleum and
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energy; 2) raw materials, industry and construction; 3) consumer goods; 4) consumer
services; 5) financial and real estate services; and 6) technology and communications.
Taking into account the differences in the frequency of observations in each sector, we
have assigned a “1” to sectors 1, 4, 5 and 6; “2” to sector 2; and “3” to sector 3.
The third variable we have used is firm age. This variable is measured as the num-
ber of years that the firm has been in existence. To calculate this, we deducted the
year of the firm’s founding from the year of our study. We have included this vari-
able because older firms have greater opportunities for internationalising their oper-
ations and developing the experience required to exploit these operations and
increase their returns (Calof, 1998; Zahra et al., 2007; Barroso, Villegas and Pérez-
Calero, 2011).
Board size, measured as the number of members of the board, is an important
demographic characteristic which could affect the firm’s results (Kim, 2005, 2007).
There are a greater number of abilities and specialised opinions within a large board
than in a smaller board and the former is better equipped to establish external links.
They are therefore more likely to have access to critical resources (Goodstein, Gau-
tam and Boeker, 1994), which will affect the firm’s general performance (Amason
and Sapienza, 1997). As for influencing internationalisation, it has been argued that
firms with larger boards are more internationalised because of the demand for more
information from the board of directors, and the ability of a group to process infor-
mation depends on the number of people in that group (Sanders and Carpenter,
1998). We have measured board size by the number of members of the board.
Boards of directors may be structured in such a way that the CEO also acts as
President of the Board (duality), or where the post of CEO and President are sepa-
rated. This can influence the firm’s internationalisation and must therefore be con-
trolled in our study. Thus, for example, some authors propose that internationalisa-
tion requires that there should be separate posts for President and Chief Executive
(no duality), since in complex environments firms require a greater delegation of
authority and the division of responsibilities, which allows for a greater breadth of
experience (Holm and Schuler, 2010). Non-duality will increase the capacity for
information-processing and overseeing the management and will bring different net-
works and additional resources into play (Singla, George and Eliyaht, 2010). Con-
versely, when the CEO is also President of the Board, he or she tends to support ini-
tiatives that produce more secure results in order to protect their position on the
board, and, therefore, will avoid risky strategies such as internationalisation (Ell-
strand et al., 2002). For this measure we created a dichotomous variable with the
value 1 when there is duality and 0 when there is none.
Finally, we controlled the proportion of external (non-executive) directors on the
board, which indicates the relative impact that this type of director has on the
board’s decisions (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2006). A high per-
centage of external board members could have a positive effect on internationalisa-
tion, as it would help to control the management team’s actions and would provide
the resources required for international expansion (Singla et al., 2010; Datta, Mus-
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teen and Herrmann, 2009). Conversely, internal board members demonstrate an
adverse behaviour to risk and avoid high levels of international commitment (Fila-
totchev, Dynomina, Wright and Buck, 2001). To calculate this variable we cate-
gorised the type of board member. Following the indicators of the codes of good cor-
porate governance, we classified the board members into four main categories: 1)
internal or executive board members, who are part of the management team or hold
a position within the firm; 2) external representative directors, that is, those elected
to represent shareholders with a significant shareholder participation; 3) external
independent boards members –high profile professionals who can carry out their
function on the board without being affected by their relations with the firm, its
major shareholders or its management; and 4) other external board members who,
because of special circumstances or links cannot be considered as being either repre-
sentative or independent (CNMV, 2006). We calculated the total number of external
board members on each board as the sum of the directors classified as 2, 3 and 4,
divided by the total number of board members.
The information for the control variables was taken from several sources,
depending on whether the variable related to the firm or the board. At the firm lev-
el, we used the Osiris database and the stock exchange sectoral classification pub-
lished by the CNMV. The Osiris database contains financial and accounting infor-
mation on firms, banks and insurance companies from all over the world, and which
are listed on the stock exchange. Authors such as Jackling and Johl (2009) and Singh
and Gaur (2009) have used this database in their studies of corporate governance.
From this source we obtained information on the size and age of the firm: the num-
ber of employees and the date of the firm’s foundation. The sectoral classification
provided information on the sector within which each firm operates. The informa-
tion on the boards was taken from the corporate governance reports available from
the CNMV. These reports provided information on the number of members on each
board, whether there is duality of President and Chief Executive and the type of
directors that make up the board, using the following categories: executive, repre-
sentative, independent, and other external.
Results
Table 1 is a summary of the descriptive statistics (the number of observations,
minimum, maximum and average values and standard deviation) of the continuous
variables used in our model, and the percentage frequencies of the dichotomous vari-
ables. The descriptive statistics of the sample show that the degree of international-
isation of the firms in the study is fairly moderate (0.7). With regard to the board’s
human capital, 39% have an international background and 45% hold a Masters
Degree. Finally, the average number of interlocks for the firms in our sample was
4.19, with a maximum value of 12 interlocks per firm, which is considerably higher
than the average for the group.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables used. All of the VIFs are
substantially lower than 2, and there are therefore no problems of multicolinearity
in our model.
We now go on to estimate our theoretical model using linear regression. One of
the approaches to analyzing data from several firms at different points in time is
through an MCO regression. This is known as pooled regression (pooled OLS).
We use OLS to examine our hypotheses as this technique enables non-linear sta-
tistical association to be analysed: non-linear components were represented by the
square of the variables. Prior studies that propose the existence of a relationship
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2. Zero-order Correlation
Variable Number of Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Frecuency
observations values values
Variables continuas
intdiv 468 0,7 0,47 0,012 1,91
edu 468 0,45 0,2 0 1
interback 468 0,39 0,22 0 1
interl 468 4,19 2,03 0,33 11,8
firmsize 468 13.155,9 33.587,76 6 285.106
age 468 50,91 34,25 2 164
boardsize 468 10,9 3,43 5 21
non-executive directors 468 0,81 0,12 0,33 1
Variables categóricas
y dicotómicas
sector 1 156 33,33
sector 2 156 33,33
sector 3 156 33,33
no- duality 145 30,98
duality 323 69,02





edu 0,3** 1 1,25
interback 0,21** 0,39** 1 1,26
interl -0,08† 0,06 0,13** 1 1,10
firmsize 0,12* -0,01 0,03 -0,05 1 1,17
age -0.03 0,06 0,13** -0,04 -0,04 1 1,09
sector 0,07 0,15** -0,04 -0,14** -0,25** 0,19** 1 1,25
boardsize 0,1* -0,13** -0,15** -0,06 0,27** -0,06 -0,3** 1 1,36




0,02 0,1* -0,03 -0,04 -0,1* 0,13** -0,04 0,27** -0.18** 1 1,27
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between external links and performance have also used OLS regressions (Carpenter
and Westpthal, 2001; Filatotchev, 2006; Tian et al., 2011).
Our model uses dichotomous variables or temporal dummies for each year of the
sample, to allow us to capture unobservable events that are common to all firms dur-
ing a particular period. These dichotomous variables can be used to control the events
experienced by all of the firms in a given year, which reduces important biases.
As has been suggested in other studies (Wincent et al., 2009; Kor and Sundara-
murthy, 2009), and in order to make our results more robust with regard to the
choice of variables, we also considered other ways of measuring our dependent vari-
able –internationalisation. While this work defends the use of a composite measure
to calculate the degree of internationalisation of a firm, we consider the use of inter-
national sales in isolation (Autio, Sapienza and Almedida, 2000; Jaw and Lin, 2009;
Qian, 2002; Tallman and Li, 1996; Wolff and Pett, 2000; Chen, 2011). By substi-
tuting these variables in each of the proposed models, our results lose significance.
The R2 is considerably reduced in each of the models, which would indicate that the
significance of the predictive capability of the model is reduced. The joint signifi-
cance test of our explanatory variables also decreases. All of this backs up our choice
of dependent variable.
To analyse the linear regression we used the Stata/SE 10.0. program.
Following our pooled regression analysis, we propose various models, to include
each of the working hypotheses. In model one of Table 3 we introduce the control
variables, three of which are significant: board size, firm size, and sector. Despite the
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Table 3. Results of Pooled OLS Regression Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
tβ β β β βt t t t
firmsize 1.73** 3,01 1,49** 2,87 1,39** 2,88 1,28** 2,81 1,30** 2,81
age -0,00 -1,10 -0,00 -1,24 -0,00 -1,62 -0,00† -1,72 -0,00 -1,60
sector 0,08** 2,73 0,06* 2,12 0,07* 2,58 0,06* -1,59 0,06* 2,12
boardsize 0,01* 2,18 0,02** 3,47 0,03*** 4,00 0,02*** 3,82 0,02*** 3,67




0,02 0,08 -0,21 -1,06 -0,22 -1,10 -0,2 -1,03 -0,23 -1,14
edu 0,75*** 7,11 0,63*** 5,87 0,64*** 5,96 0,65*** 6,12
interback 0,3** 2,99 0,32** 3,24 0,32*** 3,24
interl -0,03** -2,65 -0,02† -1,74
interl2 -0,00 -0,94
anual effect si si si si si
F 2,49** 8,41*** 8,90*** 8,91*** 8,30***
R2 0,054 0,15 0,169 0,181 0,183
S.E. 0,459 0,446 0,432 0,429 0,429
number of
observations
468 468 468 468 468
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lack of significance in the other control variables, these are, in theory, relevant and
should remain in the model. All of these variables, as mentioned above, have been
positively linked to the firm’s international diversification. Models 2 to 5 are
designed to test the proposed hypotheses. We have taken into account the problems
of heteroscedasticity, and where this has been detected, we have estimated a robust
model.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 propose that both the educational level of the board members
and their international background are positively related to the degree of internation-
al diversification of the firm. According to models 2 and 3, analysis confirms both of
the hypotheses put forward (b=0.75 p<0.001 and b=0.3 p<0.01, respectively).
In model 4, however, the estimated coefficient of the external links is significant
but with a negative value (b=-0.03 p<0.01). To test the curvilinear relationship, we
added the squared value to the regression equation in model 5. As shown in the
table, the square of the external links was negative and non-significant; the coeffi-
cient of the first order effects was now negative, but with less significance than in the
previous model. We cannot therefore accept our hypothesis 3.
Finally, we would point out that while model 1 explains 5.4% of the variance,
this percentage increases through the models, rising to slightly above 18% in model
5. Bearing in mind that this percentage is very similar to that of model 4, this would
indicate that if we add the squared effects of the external links variable, our model
gains no significance at all, as we should have considered a linear effect between the
two variables. We will examine this aspect in greater detail in the next section. The
significance test of our explanatory variables also shows how the variables were sig-
nificantly different to 0 in all of the models (p<0.001 for models 2, 3, 4 and 5).
Discussion and conclusions
Much of the previous research into boards of directors has studied the influence
of this governing body on the firm’s results, without considering the human and social
capital of its members. Our work looks at the importance of electing board members
with particular abilities, knowledge and relationships that enable the firm to achieve
good international results. Given that foreign expansion and the development of
international operations lead to increased environmental complexity and uncertainty
and, therefore, to greater potential risks for the firm, it is vital to elect directors who
are able to identify and exploit opportunities in international territories.
Our results confirm the relationship between the educational level and the degree
of international diversification. Specifically, we can claim that holding an additional
Master Degree or specialist qualification can increase the ability of the board to
influence the degree of a firm’s international diversification. Sanders and Carpenter
(1998) argue that internationalisation demands a greater level of information from
the board members, and that the ability of the group to process this information
depends on its competences and abilities (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001). Other
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authors (Wincent et al., 2009; Reeb and Zhao, 2009; Kim and Lin, 2010) claim that
education is directly related to the ability to learn and process information, which
enables the board members to be more efficient in collecting, filtering and process-
ing the great diversity of information in the complex international environment. As
has been demonstrated for the TMT (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Bantel and Jack-
son, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998; Karami,
Analoui and Kakabadse, 2006), some highly qualified board members make more
rational contributions to the decision-making process, reaching more creative solu-
tions to complex problems. Similarly, they bring a greater confidence to the decision-
making process, increasing the number of points of view and encouraging others to
be more accepting of change. All of this helps to increase the ability of the board to
promote high-risk strategies (Amason, Shrader and Tompson, 2006), such as inter-
nationalisation.
Our analysis also confirms the influence of an international background on inter-
national diversification. This result supports the idea proposed by some authors
(Henderson, 2005; Barroso et al., 2011; Rivas et al., 2009; Rivas, 2012) that the
international background of the board members reduces environmental uncertainty
and dependence, so that the board members are more confident when making deci-
sions on internationalisation. Likewise, studying a course at international level
increases the specialised knowledge required for operating in international markets,
all of which aids the collection, analysis and interpretation of information regarding
global opportunities, and enables the board to play a fundamental role in the deci-
sion-making process at international level (Zahra et al., 2007; Hambrick, Geletkany-
cz and Fredrickson, 1993).
On the other hand, our results do not confirm the inverted U curvilinear rela-
tionship between external social capital –directors’ links with members of other
boards– and the degree of internationalisation of a firm. However, our analysis
seems to indicate that this relationship will be negative and significant when we do
not include the squared value, which leads us to consider the possibility that the
inclusion of directors who increase the number of external links will have negative
repercussions on the firm’s international performance. This fact is consistent with
our negative argument that board members who are “overloaded” by serving on sev-
eral boards at once cannot devote sufficient time to each one.
We recognise that there are certain limitations to this work. Our study is focused
on the boards of large Spanish firms quoted on the Continuous Market. As we have
already stated, due to the lack of available databases, we have had to use relevant
secondary data in order to construct our own database. We have included these firms
in our sample because of their requirement to publish data on their corporate gov-
ernance and their level of internationalisation. However, these firms are only a part
of the total number of Spanish organisations. Secondly, given the specific character-
istics of Spanish boards, our results cannot be generalised to other contexts and so
the sample should be extended to include other countries, or perhaps a simultaneous
or comparative study should be undertaken. Finally, we should continue to research
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our dependent variable, the degree of international diversification, and investigate
new sources and methods of measuring the degree of firms’ internationalisation. It
would also be interesting, since we have this information at our disposal, to study
the destination external markets chosen for foreign assets and sales. Not all markets
present the same degree of uncertainty, and so in order to achieve the same results,
boards need to maintain different levels of human and social capital. It would be use-
ful in future investigations to know the level of internationalisation of the firms that
boards are able to access through their interlocks.
A practical implication of this work relates to the selection of board members. In
order to increase board effectiveness and to achieve better international results, the
selection process should focus on the election of directors who have an existing
knowledge and experience of international markets, or who have the required ability
to process new information and seek creative solutions in an unstable environment.
To summarise, our investigation contributes to the development of the theory of
board effectiveness and how this in turn leads to improved decision-making in the
field of internationalisation.
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